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domestic agenda, it explains Johnson’s
expansion of the Vietnam War in such
a different direction from Kennedy.
The well-researched text concludes
by looking beyond Vietnam at how
well the pattern holds under different circumstances and time periods,
to include the Iraq war. Saunders’s
framework categorizes presidents as
belonging to either of two ideal types.
While this may hold from a strictly
political science view, it falls short of
the reality of history. For this reason,
the book will appeal more to political scientists or those seeking modelcentric explanations of events. This
work should also have strong appeal
for strategists and people serving on
planning or policy staffs. Understanding how senior leaders view the world
is often as significant as factual knowledge of a given situation when providing recommended courses of action.
LT. COL. FREDERICK H. BLACK, JR., U.S. ARMY
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Marrin, Stephen. Improving Intelligence Analysis:
Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2011. 192pp. $130

A former CIA analyst turned scholar,
Stephen Marrin attempts to bridge the
gap between intelligence studies as an
academic discipline and intelligence as
a bureaucratic function. His analysis
grounded in the intelligence literature, Marrin provides readers a good
overview of such intelligence-studies
classics as those of Sherman Kent,
Roger Hilsman, and Richards Heuer,
along with more contemporary work
by Roger George, James Bruce, Richard
Betts, and Amy Zegart. Marrin certainly
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displays a penchant for the academic
that is informed by his former role
as an intelligence analyst. He believes
“intelligence scholarship can provide
knowledge and insight useful for the
analytic practitioner; so useful in fact,
that it will help improve the quality of
the resulting intelligence analysis.”
With such a goal, Marrin offers six
ways to improve intelligence analysis,
but it is unclear how he derives these.
Marrin does not draw his conclusions
from known cases of highly publicized
intelligence assessments. In the case
of Iraq, it would have been useful to
illustrate why the State Department’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research had
a better answer on the status of Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction program
than the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Had Marrin tested his advice against
known intelligence failures or drawn
from assessments of failed analysis, his
advice would be more convincing.
With intelligence increasingly public
and used to justify or explain foreignpolicy decisions, it seems one more
piece of advice Marrin could offer
is how to incorporate public discussions or open sources into analysis.
Fortunately or not, the intelligence
community does not have a monopoly on the “facts,” so discussing
the ways in which analysts can more
readily connect with scholars and
the private sector would be useful.
To be fair, the book is focused on
intelligence analysis, but it seems to
ignore how, why, and where facts are
collected. In an era when both scholars and private citizens have access
to information, it is important that
Marrin address the epistemological
underpinnings of what is being analyzed. There is a logical and important
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relationship between collection and
analysis that is in need of further study.
In spite of the book’s shortcomings,
Marrin offers readers a look at what
a junior CIA analyst does and offers
a sketch of how to move beyond the
“generalized intuition” that often afflicts
intelligence analysis. His discussion of
improving intelligence analysis through
empathy is interesting and has implications for personnel recruiting. In fact,
this slim volume should be valued by
human-resources departments and
senior managers as they prepare for the
next reorganizations of their agencies.
DEREK REVERON
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Rickards, James. Currency Wars: The Making of
the Next Global Crisis. New York: Penguin Group,
2011. 304pp. $26.95

Is the United States now engaged in a
currency war? Are we involved in an
international competition of currency
devaluation that will impact America
in seldom-studied ways that are critical
to its defense? James Rickards suggests
that we are, and that today’s currency war could be as devastating to
national security as any kinetic war.
James Rickards is a counselor, investment banker, and risk manager with
over thirty years of experience in
capital markets. He advises the Department of Defense, the intelligence
community, and major hedge funds
on global finance. He served as a facilitator for the first-ever financial war
games conducted by the Pentagon.
Rickards argues that currency conflicts should and must interest our
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military leaders. Such conflicts can
and should be prepared for, because
the cheap-dollar policies of both the
present and immediate past administrations portend a dollar crisis. Rickards
argues that policy makers have lost the
enormous national-security advantages that dollar hegemony affords,
by adopting weak-dollar policies.
In part 1 Rickards discusses Pentagonsponsored “war” gaming in 2009, using
rules of engagement (ROE) in which the
only “weapons” allowed were currencies,
stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Because
the specific ROE were unrealistic,
however, the results were inconclusive,
although useful for future simulations.
Then, in part 2, the author delves into
historical accounts of what he calls
“Currency War I” (1921–36) and
“Currency War II” (1967–87). Rickards
argues that we have now entered
“Currency War III,” the three primary
combatants being the United States,
China, and Europe. He argues that there
are four possible outcomes of Currency
War III: a move to multiple reserve currencies, with the dollar playing a much
smaller role; an International Monetary
Fund–controlled world money, called
“Special Drawing Rights”; a return to
the gold standard, at a substantially
higher gold price (the prospect endorsed by Rickards); and chaos. This last
possibility and the associated dollar collapse appears most likely to the author.
It is unfortunate that Rickards did not
include any reference to Edward S.
Miller’s Bankrupting the Enemy: The
U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl
Harbor (Naval Institute Press, 2007),
written by a skilled financial analyst
who discusses in great detail how the
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration
used dollar hegemony to block Japan
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